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Chapter 7:
Constructing Corruption   
Gjalt de Graaf, Pieter Wagenaar, and
Michel Hoenderboom     
1. Introduction
As Deleuze and Guattari say to demonstrate the importance of concepts in
philosophy and science: ‘Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like
heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented,
fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing without their creator’s sig-
nature’ (1994: 5). Corruption, of course, is the concept of interest here. In this
chapter, however, we will not study what the concept is or means, but discuss
theories and studies that look at how the definitions of corruption have come
about in academic and social discourses, with special emphasis on the effects
of using the concept.
Other chapters in this book (e.g. Huisman/Vande Walle, Huberts, and
Rose-Ackerman) study corruption empirically within a positivistic research
tradition; here we will look at theoretical and empirical corruption research
that can be called post-positivistic, meaning that they are not after one truth,
or out to find and agree on one ‘right’ definition or meaning of the concept
‘corruption’. The corruption researchers we will cite use different terms to
label their theoretical stance. Some call it ‘cultural’ or ‘anthropological’, oth-
ers ‘neo-classical’, and there are even those who use the term ‘post-modern’.
Discussions and controversies about postmodernism are numerous (e.g.
Bauman 1991, 1993; Latour 1991), both in terms of the concept and the en-
suing societal changes of the second half of the twentieth century. Reviewing
them or exploring the rather vague notion of postmodernism is, however,
outside the purview of this chapter. The scholars cited here are interested in
how the actors define corruption. Most other approaches in this book define
what the phenomenon of corruption entails and then look at the causes of that
phenomenon. Here we especially look at the causes and effects of the usage
of the very label ‘corruption’. When looking at corruption in this sense, lan-
guage plays an important role and the concept of discourse becomes impor-
tant.
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2. The social construction of corruption
What is most striking when looking at the definitions of corruption in post-
positivist studies is the emphasis on social constructivism: ‘corrupt’ is what is
considered corrupt at a certain place and at a certain time. Or, as Andersson
and Heywood (forthcoming) put it:
‘The key point is that there are many different types of corruption, which vary according to
the sector in which they occur (public or private; political or administrative), the actors in-
volved (for instance, state officials, politicians entrepreneurs and so forth), the impact they
have (localized or extensive) and the degree to which they are formalized (embedded and
systemic or occasional and sporadic).’
Eleven years ago, Michael Johnston (1996: 331-334) proposed to define cor-
ruption as ‘the abuse, according to the legal or social standards constituting a
society’s system of public order, of a public role or resource for private bene-
fit’. He suggested studying how the meaning of terms like ‘abuse,’ ‘public
role,’ and ‘private benefit’ are constructed at a given moment in a certain
place, and how and why the lines between public/private, state/society, poli-
tics/administration, and institutions/sources of power are drawn.
A wide range of corruption researchers draws attention to the contextuality
of corruption and its various definitions. Huntington’s (1989: 377) much-used
definition of corruption is ‘behavior of public officials which deviates from
accepted norms in order to serve private ends’. But just as ‘accepted norms’
change over time and across cultures, so do the distinctions between public
and private, and between what is and is not corrupt. Many illustrations of this
can be found in Haller and Shore (2005), who offer an array of authors’ per-
ceptions of corruption in different cultural and institutional contexts with case
studies from countries such as India, Bolivia, Portugal, Russia, Romania, and
the United States. An example of their findings takes place in Russia’s transi-
tional society of the 1990s, where personalized agreements between doctor
and patient based on, say, a certain fee plus a few bottles of vodka, eventually
superseded the official fee-for-service framework of state health care. Some-
thing that had been illegal and considered highly corrupt during the Soviet pe-
riod – a physician commanding money for personal gain in exchange for
services – was at that time considered morally acceptable. A patient-
interviewee described such payment ‘as a moral action that conveyed recogni-
tion and respect for the professional's attention and expertise’. A physician’s
demand for high prices was more a sign of his or her medical competence than
a reflection of connections or privilege. On the contrary, it was the institu-
tional state health care system that was eventually regarded as corrupt for fa-
voring the higher strata of the population. Not only does this example prove a
shift in norms concerning appropriate provision of healthcare, it also signifies
that overstepping the boundary between the public and private spheres is not
always adequate in labeling corruption (Rivkin-Fish 2005: 47-49, 63).
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Tänzler (2007), who advocates a ‘cultural approach’ to corruption, tells of
a Philippine Prime Minister forced from office precisely because he was not
corrupt. If the Prime Minister refused to use his power to take care of family
and friends, the line of thinking was, then what could the public expect from
him? Tänzler demonstrates the importance of deconstructing the social reali-
ties of culture to perceive corruption (see also De Zwart, this volume. Note
that De Zwart explicitly distances himself from postmodern approaches).
Sissener (2001), who proposes an ‘anthropological perspective on cor-
ruption’, finds that Western approaches of corruption are often exactly that:
they are peculiarly Western, influenced as they are by Weber’s famous ideal
type of bureaucracy, and not easily applied to non-Western societies. Sissener
then tries to understand the values behind behavior that a Western observer
would probably regard as corrupt, and how the social reality in which the be-
havior takes place is constructed from the inside. In countries like Bangla-
desh, China or Nepal, the public official who issues favors for a remuneration
of some kind within an established network is not corrupt; his or her actions
are simply a social obligation to help. Deals within the network are consid-
ered normal (Sissener 2001).
3. The effects of the corruption concept
The point of the previous section was to lay ground for a concept of corrup-
tion that is heavily contested and socially constructed. Post-positivist corrup-
tion theories demonstrate that the definition and meaning of corruption is
hardly trivial, that the effects of using the label ‘corruption’ can be major,
that ‘what the concept is is less interesting than what it does, a shift in em-
phasis that also allows us to put aside the somewhat stale debate about uni-
versal or culturally relative elements’ (Bracking 2007: 11). Post-positivistic
approaches discussed in the remainder of this chapter focus less on what cor-
ruption is than what the effects of its usage are. We are interested in what
causes the use of the concept of ‘corruption’ and the consequences thereof.
Any specific definition of corruption will automatically lead to a specific
‘solution’ (de Graaf 2007); instead we will look at the causes and effects of
corruption definitions and discourses.
Being labeled ‘corrupt’ usually has an enormous social impact. We once
interviewed a Dutch police officer who was convicted for taking a bribe from
a former colleague, then an attorney. He was convicted for accepting a cell
phone in exchange for leaking some minor information to the attorney during
a long phone conversation. Both he and his wife were fired from the police
force. His wife fought for several years in court before being reinstated. They
lost most of their friends and suffered emotionally. They were largely
shunned at the few social events they still took part in; others did not want to
be in the presence of a ‘corrupt police officer.’
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Because of these enormous social consequences, the most important issue
‘may not be what the term ‘corruption’ means, but rather who gets to decide
what it means and how widely those decisions will be accepted’ (Le Billon
2005: 686). Not surprisingly, accusations of corruption are often used strate-
gically: ‘corruption serves to underwrite elite class formation in Zimbabwe,
as well as being a key concept in discursive and ideological warfare between
Mugabe and his opponents’ (Bracking 2009: 43).
The definition issue also raises questions of cultural bias. As Chadda
(2004: 122) writes on the use of TI’s (Transparency International) definition
in developing countries: ‘To judge transactions originating in the traditional
sphere as corrupt because they clash with the requirements of the legal ra-
tional order can be seen as simply an ideological argument for the rapid de-
struction of the traditional sphere.’ Andersson and Heywood (forthcoming: 5)
go so far as to claim that:
‘the very concept of corruption has been increasingly instrumentalized for political ends
since the end of the Cold War – most especially in those countries where corruption is per-
ceived to be a major issue. Indeed the debate on the meaning and interpretation of corrup-
tion has led to the development of proposed solutions for corruption which focus primarily
on issues of institutional design’.
4. Language and Meaning
In recent decades, discussions on the nature of truth have profoundly affected
social research. Instead of assuming a given world ‘out there’, waiting to be
discovered, attention is being drawn to the language processes through which
the world is represented. The access we have to a reality outside language is
highly problematic. Language does not simply report facts; it is not a simple
medium for the transport of meaning. The meaning and effect of words de-
pend on the context in which they are spoken or written. Du Gay (1996: 47):
‘The meaning that any object has at any given time is a contingent, historical achievement
(…) theorists of discourse argue that the meaning of objects is different from their mere
existences, and that people never confront objects as mere existences, in a primal manner;
rather these objects are always articulated within particular discursive contexts’.
Perhaps it is the case, as some philosophers claim, that what exists in the world
is a necessity (independent of human beings or language), but things can only
be differentiated through language. The world itself does not give meaning to
objects; this is done through language. Stated simply, although things might
exist outside language, they get their meanings through language.
This view of language implies the possibility of describing the context of
corruption (cases) as a discursive construction. The meaning of anything al-
ways exists in particular discursive contexts; meaning is always contextual,
contingent, and historical. The term ‘corruption’, therefore, is always socially
and historically constructed as well.
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How can we transition from an ontological and epistemological stance of
meaning that is always historically and socially constructed to a theoretical
model useful to empirical research? De Graaf (2007) has offered an example
from postmodern corruption research where empirical corruption research is
conducted based on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social action (1977; 1990;
1998; Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992). By combining macro and micro factors and
everything in between, it is an example of how concrete corruption case
studies can be conducted. Contextual research in this way can establish dis-
positions that can lead to corruption. Since dispositions do not always mani-
fest, they cannot be called ‘causes’ in the strict sense of the word. What is
important in this type or research is the receptiveness of an individual to cor-
ruption, and whether the receptiveness is triggered.
5. Discourse and discourse analysis
The concept of discourse plays an important role in most post-positivistic
corruption research and has many meanings. Of its many interpretations (see
Alvesson/Karreman 2000), here we define discourse as ‘a specific ensemble
of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and
transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is
given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer 1995: 44). For example, psychi-
atric discourse brought the idea of an unconscious into existence in the nine-
teenth century (cf. Foucault 1977; Phillips/Hardy 2002: 3). Discourses con-
tain groups of statements that provide a way of talking and thinking about
something, thereby giving meaning to social reality. Discourses are not ‘out
there’ between reality and language; they are not just a group of signs. They
refer to practices that systematically form the objects we speak of. Discourse
is not just a ‘way of seeing’ – a worldview – but is embedded in social prac-
tices that reproduce the ‘way of seeing’ as ‘truth.’ Discourses are constitutive
of reality (de Graaf 2001). What is and is not true cannot be seen outside dis-
course; it is internal to it. By looking at what people say and write, we can
learn how their world is constructed.
Since discourses in our context institutionalize the way of talking about
something, they produce knowledge and thereby shape social practices. Cor-
ruption cases cannot be understood without the discourses that give them
meaning. Discourses contain the conditions of possibility of what can and
cannot be said. The fact that a question arises about corruption is as interest-
ing as the question asked (and the questions not asked). And every question
asked gets some form of an answer (including no answer), which has conse-
quences. Discourses help us understand that a certain question is asked, and
give us the spectrum of possible solutions to problems arising from it, i.e.,
what is or is not seen as a viable solution to a specific moral problem. A
problem’s definition inevitably predisposes certain solutions, and vice versa
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(Eeten 1998: 6; Kingdon 1995; Rochefort 1994; Wildavsky 1987). Compare
this with the following quote from Schön and Rein (1993: 153):
‘When participants (…) name and frame the (…) situation in different ways, it is often dif-
ficult to discover what they are fighting about. Someone cannot simply say, for example,
‘Let us compare different perspectives for dealing with poverty,’ because each framing of
the issue of poverty is likely to select and name different features of the problematic situa-
tion. We are no longer able to say that we are comparing different perspectives on ‘the
same problem’, because the problem itself has changed.’
Like meaning, values are immanent features of discourse. When we give
meaning to something, we are also valuing it. Even though a Durkheimian
view is clearly not endorsed here (our emphasis is on language, not institu-
tions), there is a parallel. To Durkheim social institutions, collective ways of
thinking, feeling, and doing are not empty but full of values (values give
meaning to relationships). In similar fashion, discursive practices are not
empty; they are filled with values. By giving something a name, we highlight
certain aspects. But in that same process, all other possible qualities are
placed in the background or even ignored. Values, causal assumptions and
problem perceptions affect each other. In our daily lives, we jump so often
between normative and factual statements that we do not realize how much
our views of facts determine whether we see problems in the first place. But
when we study those discussions more carefully, we can see that ‘is’ and
‘ought’ are intertwined. Seemingly technical positions in discourses on cor-
ruption (‘was he bribed or not?’) conceal normative commitments. Dis-
courses make more than claims of reality – they accomplish what Schön and
Rein (1994) have called the ‘normative leap’, or the connection between a
representation of reality and its consequences for action. Within most ver-
sions of discourse theory, the strict dichotomy between facts and values
ceases to make sense. Facts and values here are not treated as ontologically
different; discourse theory treats them as different sides of the same coin. The
‘is’ and ‘ought’ shape each other in countless ways. Language is thus neither
neutral nor static in communicating meaning. The awareness that language
does not neutrally describe the world is important to corruption research.
Subtle linguistic forms and associated symbolic actions shape our convictions
and presuppositions (Van Twist 1994: 79).
How does research with discourse theory work? A researcher conducts
discourse descriptions or analyses, the basis of which are texts. All verbal and
written language can be considered. A discourse analysis shows which dis-
cursive objects and subjects emerge in social practices, and which conceptu-
alizations are used. Consequently, what is left out in social practices also
emerges. It is not the purpose of discourse analysis to retrieve what authors
meant or felt. Discourse analysis is not a search for meaning in texts, empiri-
cal or otherwise. The analysis focuses on the effects of the texts on other
texts. Hajer (1995: 54): ‘discourse analysis investigates the boundaries be-
tween (…) the moral and the efficient, or how a particular framing of the dis-
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cussion makes certain elements appear fixed or appropriate while other ele-
ments appear problematic’.
A discourse analysis inquires into forms of problematization and offers a
narrative about the production of problems. Why is corruption considered a
problem (or not a problem)? Some postmodern corruption scholars would an-
swer that it is because of neo-liberal or Western interests (cf. Bahre 2005;
Brown/Cloke 2004, 2005; Doig/Marquette 2005; Le Billon 2005; Roberts/
Wright/O’Neill 2007; Szeftel 1998; Whyte 2007). We will return to this topic
later.
In conducting a discourse analysis on corruption, we can establish the
limits of what can and cannot be said in a particular context, what Foucault
(1977) called ‘the conditions of possibility’ of a discourse. The analysis can
identify the rules and resources that set the boundaries of what can be said,
thought, and done in a particular (organizational) context or situation. Mauws
(2000: 235):
‘Thus, if we are to comprehend how decisions are made (…) it is by examining the condi-
tions of possibility in relation to which these statements are formulated, that is, the often
implicit institutionalized speech practices that guide what is and what is not likely to be
said (Bourdieu)’.
Describing a corruption case in this tradition makes the discourses the objects
of study, rather than the (corrupt) moral agents. By doing so, moral aspects
come to the fore. In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, Bracking (2009: 35)
argues that ‘only through a critical poststructuralist analysis, which examines
how ‘corrupt’ subjects are fixed discursively, can one find a consistent posi-
tion on when concessionary state redistribution becomes constitutive of pat-
rimonial state practice.’
Brown and Cloke (2005) explore the limitations of the dominant neo-
liberal perspective on governance, showing how international financial insti-
tutions have been promoting a specific discourse on corruption in Nicaragua
that separates it from its historicity and the specific political economy within
which it developed. Within this discourse, governance and institutional re-
form are seen as ways to combat corruption and are within the limits of what
can be said in corruption discourse, whereas possible solutions that look at
the historical roots of the Nicaraguan culture, like closer private sec-
tor/government relations, are not.
Lazar (2005: 212, 223-224) focuses on everyday corruption and local
politics in the highland city of El Alto in Bolivia, looking at perceptions of
corruption at different political levels. Corruption and its ‘necessary counter-
part’, public works (obras), serve as the key discursive elements for citizens
to assert expectations of their leaders. Lazar recognizes the typical clientelis-
tic structures pervading politics in which issues such as the extent to which
public money is used for private gain, but especially redistributed in the form
of obras or jobs to the people, are central. Rumor and gossip serve as a
means for the people to hold their leaders accountable pre-emptively, to es-
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tablish the notion of a public good that their leaders should serve. Corruption
discourse can also serve to express powerlessness and dissatisfaction to lead-
ers not listening to the needs of the people, and in doing so, to offset citizens’
limited capacity to hold their leaders accountable.
Ruud (2000: 271-272, 291) researches petty corruption of ordinary people
in the rural eastern Indian state of West Bengal, trying to understand corrup-
tion on the basis of the levels and places of corruption’s occurrences. He em-
phasizes that the practices exist within a fully developed normative system
that is no less moral that any other (i.e., Western) normative system. We
should not regard corruption as an isolated act with a particular body of ideas
and values, but take into account parallels in other social practices (and other
bodies of ideas and values); otherwise, corruption would be difficult to un-
derstand. The distinction between public and private, often the basis upon
which something is defined as corrupt or not, does not seem to carry the same
moral weight in all societies. From Ruud's case studies it becomes apparent
that the application of the public/private distinction in individual cases is
sometimes limited by ‘other more weightier considerations’.
6. Storylines and metaphors
One way to study how discursive practices about corruption are shaped is to
look at storylines and metaphors. Our own particular worldviews and dis-
courses position us within discussions in terms of the concepts, metaphors,
and stories of that discourse. For corruption researchers, it is important that a
discourse analysis can show how forces in language influence moral posi-
tions by looking at the role metaphors and storylines play within a discourse.
Discourse analysis can also gain perspectives into the structure, dynamics,
and directions of conflicting discourses, like narrative strategies.
Stories play an important role in people’s lives; in large part, they give
meaning to them (Watson 1994). If you want to get to know someone, you
ask for a life story. Stories tell about what is important and what is not. Phi-
losophers like Johnson (1993) or McIntyre (1991) would go so far as to argue
that stories are central to creating human understanding: ‘I can only answer
the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question, ‘Of what
story or stories do I find myself a part?’ (O’Connor 1997: 304). Fisher (1987:
xiii) claims that ‘all forms of human communication need to be seen funda-
mentally as stories’. It is therefore not surprising that stories are also impor-
tant to studies of corruption. Many scholars agree that stories are filled with
information and are efficient at conveying it (Roe 1994: 9). Boje (1991: 106)
argues: ‘People engage in a dynamic process of incremental refinement of
their stories of new events as well as ongoing reinterpretations of culturally
sacred story lines’; (1995: 1001): ‘In sum people do not just tell stories, they
tell stories to enact an account of themselves and their community’.
Gjalt de Graaf, Pieter Wagenaar, and Michel Hoenderboom106
The assumption that meaning is produced in linguistic form fits well with
exploring stories, which are simply one type of linguistic form, or elements
of a discourse with certain characteristics. Stories are especially important for
corruption researchers because they contain values – ideas about good and
evil, right and wrong. For instance, Pujas and Rhodes (1999) address the re-
port of the Committee of Experts of March 1999 concerning accusations of
fraud and nepotism within the European Commission, in which a storyline
develops of the crusade of a ‘clean north’ versus a ‘corrupt south’. That three
of the four implicated Commissioners were from a ‘southern’ country
(France, Spain, and Portugal) and only one from a ‘northern’ country (Ger-
many) seemed to strengthen the view. Yet Pujas and Rhodes questioned its
fairness:
‘Is there really a ‘clash of cultures’ in Europe between quite different types of public ad-
ministration, responsible for a ‘fundamental division’ in the European institutions between
the ambassadors of ‘clean’ northern government and the cynical representatives of closed,
corrupt and clannish southern bureaucracy?’ (1999: 688-689).
Within stories, ‘is’ and ‘ought’ are closely connected. Even if they seem to
give simple factual descriptions, an enormous implicit normative power lies
within narratives. Hayden White (1980: 26): ‘What else could narrative clo-
sure exist of than the passage of one moral order to another? (…) Where, in
any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a
moralizing impulse is present too’. According to White, the events that are re-
corded in the narrative appear ‘real’ precisely insofar as they belong to an order
of moral existence, just as they derive their meaning from their placement in
this order. It is because the events described are or are not conducive to the es-
tablishment of social order that they find a place in the narrative attesting to
their reality (Ettema/Glasser 1988: 10). A narrative analysis can therefore shed
light on how different moral positions relate to each other. It shows how nar-
rative structures (partly) determine moral positions and identities, and how
they thereby influence the actions of individuals and organizations. And they
show how internal dynamics of a discourse can influence the moral position
taken; this can also be used strategically. An example from a study by
Bracking (2009: 44):
‘These attempts by members of the political elite to gain political ground relative to one
another by attempting to fix the others’ behavior as ‘corrupt’, entail ‘corruption’ acting as a
signifier of moral detraction in a political discourse that pretends liberal reform but serves
authoritarian power. Narratives like these often involve ‘illegal’ foreign exchange transac-
tions (...) There is also a popular narrative of corruption acting as a moral censure of a ra-
pacious elite’.
Scholars have pointed to the moral significance of metaphors. Weick (1979:
50), for example, has pointed to their operational consequences. Like stories,
metaphors are important to corruption researchers because of the (often im-
plicit) moral baggage they carry. Describing metaphors in discursive prac-
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tices can bring clarity to how metaphors, in part, morally shape discursive
practices, that is, how morality is embedded in discursive practices. This is
also noted in the theoretical postmodern corruption theories. Just think of the
consequences it has once we use the slogan of ‘war on corruption’. The
metaphor of ‘war’ opens up a discursive space in which all kind of military
and violent options are on the table to deal with the ‘problem.’ Describing
corruption as ‘a cancer that eats away at the body politic’ portrays it as a
threat to the continued existence of the state or its subordinate civil authori-
ties.
We could also look at non-textual imagery such as symbols and powerful
images that have portrayed corruption. Consider, for instance, a 2008 cartoon
by the South-African newspaper Sunday Times in which ANC leader Jacob
Zuma is portrayed as a potential rapist of Lady Justice. Shortly before that
Zuma had been charged with corruption, and in 2006 had been acquitted of
rape indictments.
7. The presence of the past
As stated above, meaning is always a contingent and historical achievement;
corruption discourses are socially and historically constructed. To this point
we have mostly looked at the social construction; many researchers, however,
look for the ‘presence of the past’: historical corruption research can follow
the traces of a discourse back in history, reveal the contingencies of a current
corruption discourse, and thus dissolve the current coherence of systems of
intelligibility. Research like this is called ‘genealogical’. For example, Wither
analyzed the change in meaning of the word ‘racketeering’ in his study of
corruption accusations against the teamsters union in the 1930s (Kreike/Jor-
dan 2004). He also observed the steadily growing discrepancy between the
public opinion of racketeering and the way the phenomenon was conceived
on the shop floor (Witwer 2004: 197-238).
In a 2008 special issue of the public administration journal Public Voices,
several historians showed how our current systems of understanding are a
historical achievement: definitions and morality concerning corruption are in
constant flux. By producing historical representations of corruption and its
morality – which are often unfamiliar to 21st century Westerners – and some-
times by isolating the moments in which more familiar representations have
emerged, historical corruption researchers can disclose the instabilities and
chance elements of our current understandings of corruption (cf. Shapiro
1992).
Hoenderboom and Kerkhoff (2008) investigated an Early Modern Dutch
corruption scandal concerning the transgressions of a local magistrate,
Lodewijk Huygens, in the city of Gorinchem. The scandal shows the impor-
tance of a contextual approach towards corruption as different sources of val-
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ues and standards of conduct made up the (in)capability and corruption of
this magistrate, such as legal arguments, public opinion as expressed in pam-
phlets and codes of the shop floor. The codes of the shop floor show that an
Early Modern magistrate such as Huygens should at least be able to maintain
harmony and balance in everyday administration, especially concerning the
bestowal of office, gift exchange, and appropriation of funds. The codes of
the shop floor contrasted sharply with legal standards, which entirely prohib-
ited the obtainment of offices by offering money or gifts. An unambiguous
standard concerning what constituted corruption was therefore lacking (Ho-
enderboom/Kerkhoff 2008).
Kroeze (2008) presented a comparable study for the nineteenth century.
He emphasized the role of scandals in shifts in administrative values, and
then focused on an 1855 scandal concerning the selling of votes, which was
in sharp contrast with the value dualism characteristic of the Early Modern
period. A dominant set of liberal values became visible whereby, for in-
stance, putting particular interests (provincial, individual) above the general
interest in matters of political representation was not allowed. Public officials
were also expected to act with ‘dignity’, ‘openness’, ‘respect’ and ‘honor’,
and all parties more or less agreed on the seriousness of violating these im-
portant values. All parties involved therefore shared the same discourse
(Kroeze 2008).
In the same issue of Public Voices Engels (2008) considered the nine-
teenth century to be a period in which existing conflicts between value sys-
tems were finally resolved, and focused on turning points. His comparison of
anti-corruption movements in three countries and focus on the related mo-
tives does not only show the public-private dichotomy becoming clearer, but
also a visible tendency towards centralization and corruption criticism closely
connected to an anti-pluralist world of ideas comprising anti-capitalism, anti-
liberalism, and anti-Semitism. Interestingly, Engels stated that there was no
positive link in nineteenth century history between modernizing or democra-
tizing forces and the anti-corruption movement (Engels 2008).
Other historians have simply shown how different perceptions of corrup-
tion were in the past, thus sensitizing us to their social constructivist nature.
Will (2004), who has studied administration in late imperial China, describes
how a Weberian-like ethos on sufficient remuneration for impartial adminis-
trators could clash with the impossibility of supplying sufficient salaries and
with a rival ethic of loyalty to an administrator’s extended family and place
of birth. His work practically mirrored Sissener’s (2001; see above) (Will
2004: 29-82). Woodfine, who did not ‘seek to resolve the notorious difficul-
ties of the concept of corruption, but will accept the term in the senses in
which it was used in contemporary discourse’ (2004: 167), studied corruption
rhetoric in England during the first part of the eighteenth century. In a world
that did not know a strict public-private dichotomy or a clear separation be-
tween politics and administration, and one that was characterized by patron-
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age and clientage, what did Walpole’s regime do to make it so vulnerable to
accusations of corruption? Walpole, it turns out, grossly amplified things by
turning corruption into an overt system and organizing machine politics much
more thoroughly than before (Woodfine 2004: 167-196). Coulloudon – an-
other historian whose approach resembles Sissener’s – describes how cor-
ruption in the Soviet Union was a practical necessity because plan targets
could often not be met without fraud. Failing to meet targets could have seri-
ous consequences for the workers involved. Superiors who committed the
necessary fraud were looked upon favorably. Unsurprisingly, therefore, cor-
rupt Soviet officials caught for fraud often felt no guilt at all (Coulloudon
2004: 247-249). Many more historical studies in which corruption is seen as
a social construct exist. See for example the recent Beiheft of the Historische
Zeitschrift (Engels/Fahrmeir/Nützenadel 2009).
8. Power and the consequences of anti-corruption
discourses
There is considerable power in structured ways of viewing reality. Power in
post-positivistic research is defined relationally rather than an institutional or
personal feature. So-called genealogical1 discourse analyses of corruption
cases and corruption controversies analyze how power and knowledge func-
tion, how the rules and resources that set the limits of what can be said are
working. Foucault (1977; 1984) has shown how power works through ‘sub-
jectification.’ Bracking (2009: 36) argues that
‘the formal definition of corruption used by international financial institutions (…) acts in
practice as a strategic resource and signifier within World Bank political discourse, indi-
cating bad governance, illegitimacy and geopolitical position (…) Rather it is the wider
strategic role that the concept plays as a disciplinary governance concept which is critical
to donors’ attempted management of African politics and societies.’
Every discourse claims to talk about reality. In doing so, it classifies what is
(not) true permitted, desirable, and so on. Truth and power are closely re-
lated. As Foucault (1984: 74) stated, ‘Truth is linked in a circular relation
with systems of power which induces and which extend it; a ‘regime of
truth’’. Power is not just repressive; it is always productive. A genealogical
discourse analysis of corruption cases can reveal some of the ways power
                                                          
1 By using a grammar in its descriptions that replaces the subject with consciousness by a
subject as the receiver of social meaning, static concepts are in genealogy made fluid in a
historical process. Within genealogy, Foucault (e.g. 1977) looked for the way forms of
problematizations are shaped by other practices. Shapiro (1992: 29): ‘Genealogy is gray,
meticulous, and patiently documentary. Committed to inquiry, it seeks endlessly to dissolve
the coherence of systems of intelligibility that give individual and collective identities to
persons/peoples and to the orders that house them by recreating the process of descent
within which subjectivities and objectivities are produced’.
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functions and can thus add to the understanding of the meaning of the cor-
ruption cases. It can follow back in history the traces of a corruption dis-
course and reveal the contingencies of a current discourse.
Building partly on the work of Foucault, some have shown how dis-
courses on corruption with their inherent worldviews give some an advantage
over others. For example, Roberts et al. (2007) have shown how the dis-
course on governance in the so-called Pacific Plan resulted in a technocratic
direction such that a particularly narrow conceptualization of governance
dominates. ‘In a direct reading of the Pacific Plan and the interventions it
empowers there is ample evidence that governance (good and bad) is used in
a disciplining way’ (Roberts/Wright/O'Neill 2007: 981). As a result, most
emphasis in the region was laid on institution building (offices of auditing,
statisticians, and so on).
‘The definitions and modes of monitoring governance provide a framework through (…)
which Pacific Island elites (…) are able to know and analyze their region (…). As the Pa-
cific comes under the gaze of an expert calculus that frames forms of governing as ‘good’
or ‘bad’ the island nations and people are once again defined in terms of lack, with answers
proffered by development experts’ (Roberts/Wright/O'Neill 2007: 978/979).
To reveal the forces or power of a discourse, genealogy has to go back to the
moment in which an interpretation or identity became dominant within a dis-
course, like the Pacific Plan, in which case many alternatives for the domi-
nant governance discourses are available. In fact, in some cases the alterna-
tives effectively challenge the governance interpretations of the Plan. ‘The
continual remake of governance occurs in several ways as social movements
act to make strategic use of the term within the context of the Pacific Plan
and beyond it’ (Roberts/Wright/O'Neill 2007: 980).
In so-called critical corruption studies, questions are asked about the con-
sequences of the international anti-corruption measures. Brown and Cloke
(2006: 281): ‘Recently, together with several other commentators (Hanlon
2004; Harrison 2003; Michael 2004; Polzer 2001; Szeftel 1998; Williams/
Beare 1999) we have been promoting the need for critical academic reflection
upon the growing calls for an international ‘anti-corruption’ crusade’. Why,
then, has there been such an explosion of interest in corruption since the
1990s, and why is there such an apparent political commitment towards tack-
ling the problem (Brown/Cloke 2004) when there is no evidence that corrupt
behavior has increased? Brown and Cloke (2004) argue that an important
factor has been shifting geopolitical priorities after the end of the Cold War.
The effects of anti-corruption measures turn out to be manifold, and towards
much more than simply reducing the levels of corruption.
‘Despite the evolution of structural adjustment into a kindlier, cuddlier poverty reduction
version, within the international financial institutions there is no serious commitment to
address the issues of regulation and control so vital to any understanding or control of cor-
ruption that debilitates countries of the North, East, West and South’ (Brown/Cloke 2007:
318).
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Once again, the importance of context is emphasized. Consequences of any-
thing will always depend on the particular situation, so it is stressed. Brown
and Cloke (2006: 282/283):
‘This lack of detailed, contextualized analysis of the implementation of supposed anti-
corruption initiatives is, we would argue, reflected everywhere, rather than having anything
to do with any uniqueness of Nicaraguan circumstances (…) we have also come across a
series of major reservations expressed particularly by those whose evaluation of such ac-
tivities stems from long-term research experience in the country concerned (…) Taken to-
gether, these points reflect our concerns that in too many cases what is referred to as cor-
ruption has been taken out of the context within which it occurs both globally (in terms of
the interactions between North and South, the transforming influence of globalization etc.)
and locally (reflecting a tendency to seek for global explanations for and solutions to a
monolithic signifier named corruption, rather than more detailed considerations of the
complex dynamics of the nature of multiple, interlinked corruptions within individual so-
cieties)’.
Most of the critical corruption studies are not against anti-corruption meas-
ures per se, but what is labeled ‘corrupt’, what is not, and the effects thereof
are critical. A special concern is what the negative consequences will be for
the poor (e.g. Brown/Cloke 2006).
The intentions of anti-corruption discourses are questioned as well. Some
claim, for example, that such discourses reflect a post-Washington consensus
seeking to reinvigorate regulatory institutions while maintaining blame for
the failure of development in South American governments (Le Billon 2005:
687). Another example: ‘Policy on corruption is deeply embedded within the
wider constructions of global neo-liberal and free market economic govern-
ance (Brown/Cloke 2004, 2005; Marquette 2003; Szeftel 1998), where a clear
divide between the political and economic and between the public and private
spheres is expected’ (Bracking 2009: 37) – remarks similar to Roberts et al.
in their study on the Pacific Plan. Kondos focuses on the meaning of favorit-
ism using a set of Nepalese cultural practices, showing that ‘the favour’ and
therefore ‘partiality’ as values are in accordance with Hindu cultural values.
Yet he also explains how Western intellectuals tend to construct ‘favoritism’
to mean corruption and its motives. As a result an ideological conflict in the
field of political ethics arises from Western pressure to adopt the principle of
‘impartiality’ in government (Kondos 1987). Gupta (1995: 375-402) focuses
on discourses of corruption in contemporary India, specifically, practices
within the lower echelons of Indian bureaucracy and representations of the
state in the mass media. He stresses vigilance toward the imperialism of the
Western conceptual apparatus, questioning the Eurocentric distinction be-
tween state and civil society and the conceptualization of the state as a uni-
tary entity. Some also see the use of (insincere) anti-corruption discourse as a
strategic tool to legitimize the invasion of Iraq (Le Billon 2005; Whyte
2007).
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In some critical corruption studies we find criticism of ideologies, espe-
cially neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism is not just blamed for promoting the in-
terests of the elite via anti-corruption discourses; some even blame it for
causing corruption. Whyte (2007: 179), for example, states: ‘Neo-liberalism
creates a fertile environment for ‘corrupt’ market transactions to flourish, be-
cause it seeks the creation of limited space as a means of promoting entrepre-
neurialism and the pursuit of self-interests’, once again reminding us of Rob-
erts et al. and the Pacific Plan. Paradoxically, the Enron scandal, which
involved falsification of balance sheets, manipulation of accounting practices,
and the creation of an image of financial health, showed the pervasive nature
of corruption within corporate America – a hotbed of neo-liberal thought.
MacLennan (2005: 156, 159) states, ‘corruption is more than a simple, iso-
lated crime committed for personal gain. It is a part of corporate and political,
culture – more pervasive and acceptable among elites than we realize. In
short, it is becoming institutionalized’.
Others are very critical of almost all anticorruption measures – integrity
workshops, national integrity system analysis, anti-corruption commissions –
in the sense that they are seen as parts of wider mendacious practices where
people are subjected as supernumeraries to human development: ‘The anti-
corruption discourse and donor practice itself can cause perverse effects
which aggravate cycles of deteriorating governance (discussed by various
authors in Bracking 2007)’ (Bracking 2009: 37). Just as we saw in the Pacific
Plan example (Roberts/Wright/O'Neill 2007), it is often stated in critical cor-
ruption literature that the current dominating anti-corruption discourse is too
focused on technical solutions and the public-private distinction, resulting in
too much attention to the public sector as the major cause of corruption. In
short, the ‘anti-corruption crusade needs to be shorn of its anti-state bias’
(Brown/Cloke 2004: 291).
9. Fighting Corruption
So what remedies do post-positivist corruption scholars propose? Clearly,
they are cautious about supporting anti-corruption measures. After all, to
them any interpretation of corruption and its causes is contestable. Applying
a post-positivist perspective to corruption could most importantly sensitize us
to the fact that people live in different social realities, and therefore have dif-
ferent perceptions of what constitutes corruption. Knowing so might give us
Western Weberians pause before flinging accusations of corruption. We
should also critically study the effects of (academic) corruption discourses
that necessarily result from any specific interpretation of or theory on the
causes of corruption.
For Bourdieu/Wacquant (1992) reflexivity is key to entailing awareness of
the effects of one's own social position, perceptions, observations, and the
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conditions of understanding that structure discourse. As an act of self-
reference reflexivity serves to make explicit the underlying unthought struc-
tures that frame our social world. Lennerfors (2008: 393-397) asks in his dis-
sertation how postmodern philosophers would have viewed corruption – one
of his sections is called ‘Baumanian corruption’- had they dealt with the phe-
nomenon. He then applies these insights to a Swedish case. In the last chapter
of his book he asks himself what ‘gifts’ he has presented to practitioners, and
‘reflection’ is his answer. He invites administrators to reflect on clear rules
and the pros and cons of grey zones. He also warns against concentrating on
rules instead of on the underlying values. Reflection should also be given to
the exact limits between the public and private spheres. As not everyone in an
organization shares the same corruption discourse, reflection on which group
of colleagues one would like to identify with could also be helpful. He issues
a similar invitation to reflect on one’s attitude to the private parties involved,
and invites the public in general to reflect on the reasons behind the accusa-
tions of corruption it reads in the newspapers.
Tänzler, who is scientific coordinator of ‘Crime and Culture: An Interna-
tional Research Project within the Sixth Framework Programme of the Euro-
pean Commission’, is rather more ambitious. The project he coordinates is
aimed at finding ‘means to optimise corruption prevention in the EU’. The
project’s point of departure is that the different perceptions of what consti-
tutes corruption in the EU are a major obstacle to fighting it, as the remedies
might well be based on corruption definitions not shared by the people they
are targeting. Making clear what different perceptions of corruption European
cultures hold might increase the fit between these perceptions, and the reme-
dies used. The project explicitly aims at finding new remedies. It might thus
lead to more success in combating corruption in Europe.2
Alternative explanations and understanding of corruption in particular
countries can help us reconsider the effectiveness of existing policy instru-
ments to combat corruption. Above all, the importance of context became
clear. Too often, corruption and its remedies are discussed outside its social
and historical context. This is dangerous because, whatever way one looks at
the causes of corruption, the contingencies are many. Any proposed solution
should take as many contingencies as possible into account.
10. Conclusion
In this chapter we looked at how post-positivistic theories study and view the
causes of corruption and the ontological stances on which the theories are
based (the importance of language and discourse). We saw that post-
positivistic scholars do not study what corruption ‘really’ is or means, but
                                                          
2 http://www.unikonstanz.de/crimeandculture/project.htm.
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how the definitions of corruption come about, both in academic and all other
discourses on corruption. And, very importantly, we looked at the effects of
using the concept.
It turns out that there is no unifying post-positivistic corruption approach;
indeed, most post-positivistic researchers denounce classifications. Lenner-
fors (2008: 309): ‘Had Bauman written about corruption, he might have
claimed that the real issue of corruption lies within the more general project
of classification and division – and hence the structuring of the world as such
(…) Bauman describes classification as an act of violence.’ Many of the
studies in this chapter turned out to have an affinity with social constructivist
ideas, just as theories that look at the (power) effects of discourses on cor-
ruption. Or, as Lennerfors (2008: 307) put it, ‘A postmodern understanding
of corruption is related to ambiguity and that no classification of the world is
accurate.’ In other words, we live in an ambiguous world with no clear cate-
gories of right and wrong, yet there are demands for clarity and demarcation.
This illustrates why, throughout the chapter, the context of corruption re-
search and discourses is fundamental.
The causes studied here were primarily those of the usage of the label
‘corruption’. This in clear contrast to chapters in this volume that see corrup-
tion as a clear phenomenon whose causes can, at least in principle, be estab-
lished. This does not mean that we believe it is not useful to try to establish
the causes of corruption; the other chapters provide new invaluable insights.
The value this chapter has added, however, is foremostly to show how useful
it is to critically study the effects of corruption discourses. And it ends with a
plea to corruption scholars to critically reflect on the effects that their own
academic discourses have on corruption.
